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Even if armed with sound scientific target allocation methodology, it is not an easy task to disaggregate the overall national targets of Biotin-HPDP saving into provinces smoothly. It is well known that multilateral climate change negotiation is the main mechanism for the differentiation of international carbon emission reduction obligations, during which different political insistences are hold on by different parties with different evidences of modeling results. The experience of past two decades shows that these multilateral regimes achieve no agreement in most case and are destined to fail (Brandt and Svendsen, 2002). The practice of energy saving target allocation in China during the past two FYPs follows much similar routine as distribution of international carbon abatement responsibility. Supported by some modeling results, the final scheme accepted by provinces were achieved by negotiations, which was conducted between central government and lower-level unities as provincial government, large enterprise and different industries. The only difference between this process and international negotiation is that it has the alternative to adopt administrative instrument to push such process. Similar game happened to international experience also exist, for instance, Western China feels that it is now time for its eastern counterparts to return the favor and to allow more “development space” for western regions. Government officials from western China are actually citing the controversial concept known as “common but differentiated responsibility”—a principle that is used in international climate negotiations to distribute mitigation responsibilities between developed and developing countries. To avoid unending argument and to be more efficient, government policy will have to play a strong role to foster local efforts and interregional cooperation on this issue, at least in the near decade. In such case, the choice preference on potential would be beneficial for fully exploring the energy saving potential of high potential regions and achieving the overall reduction optimization in China. Nevertheless, extreme reduction scheme should be avoided, because too much reduction pressure imposed on a particular province will have dampening effects on the local and regional economies. At the same time, financial and technical aid may be better provided using the command and control instrument. In this way, the energy saving potential could be explored without damaging the economic development of these regions and overall reduction optimization would be achieved in China (Yi et al., 2011).