Another line of literature using the sequential

Another line of literature using the sequential service constraint studies the importance of extracting information from agents in the queue. As argued by Peck and Shell (2003), banks having information on the queue\'s composition is essential in precluding bank runs. With a finite number of agents Green and Lin (2003) use the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies to prove that Dequalinium bank runs are not an equilibrium. In their model all agents are required to report their types to the bank at date 1, including those who do not wish to withdraw. In equilibrium, the agents report their types truthfully. Andolfatto, Nosal, and Wallace (2007) argue Turner syndrome truth-revealing reporting is no longer an optimal strategy if the agent types are correlated, and hence such a mechanism cannot rule out bank run equilibrium. In response, Cavalcanti and Monteiro (2011) show that if the agents are required to report their types twice, once before withdrawal and once after, then bank runs can still be prevented with a small efficiency loss.